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To: Transport Industry Operators

The Hong Kong High Court issued a Decision As To Costs on 5 December 2024 ordering a shipowner (which lost in an anti-suit injunction court case) to pay the winning party’s (a cargo owner) costs on an indemnity basis. HCCT 66/2024 [2024 HKCFI 3511]

I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester was a company conducting business in Egypt, and was the purchaser of cargo (purified terephthalic acid) which was shipped from China to Egypt on the Vessel (the True Friendship) effectively owned by Friendship Shipping. The cargo was found damaged on 14 June 2023 after the Vessel arrived at Adabiya, Egypt on 12 June 2023. On 21 June 2023, I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester commenced an Egyptian legal action against Friendship Shipping. On 10 August 2023, Friendship Shipping served a notice of arbitration in Hong Kong on I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester, which I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester rejected. No further steps were taken in the Hong Kong arbitration until June 2024 when Friendship Shipping sought to appoint arbitrators. Significant hearings and filings occurred in the Egyptian legal action, including final submissions made on jurisdiction and the merits, and the Egyptian Court reserved judgment to 28 November 2024.

Friendship Shipping applied to the Hong Kong High Court by Originating Summons filed on 13 June 2024 (the “OS”) for an anti-suit injunction (“ASI”) against I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester to restrain civil proceedings brought by I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester on 21 June 2023 in Egypt against Friendship Shipping and/or Friendship Shipping’s bareboat-chartered vessel the True Friendship (the “Egyptian Action”).

Friendship Shipping contended on the OS that the Egyptian Action was brought in breach of Hong Kong arbitration agreements forming part of contracts of carriage evidenced by two bills of lading issued on 17 April 2023 (the “Bills”). I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester disputed that there was any Hong Kong arbitration agreement in the Bills, and asserted that even if Friendship Shipping could establish the applicability of an Hong Kong arbitration clause, the circumstances of the case in question did not justify an exercise of the Court’s discretion to make the ASI.

I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester raised a preliminary issue, namely, that Friendship Shipping had not filed admissible evidence in support of its OS, and accordingly the OS should be dismissed.

The High Court issued its judgment on 19 November 2024. Essentially the Judge dismissed the OS because Friendship Shipping’s OS was, as at the date of the substantive hearing, not supported by admissible evidence. In case the Judge was wrong on the admissibility of evidence issue, the Judge addressed the substantive arguments by having regard to Friendship Shipping’s evidence de bene esse. On the substantive argument, the Judge did not consider it appropriate to grant Friendship Shipping an ASI against I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester, principally on the grounds of delay and comity (having regard to the resources expended by the parties and the Egyptian Court), and also having regard to Friendship Shipping’s lack of clean hands in dealing with the Court.

After winning the court case, I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester sought costs on an indemnity basis, certificate for two counsel, and summary assessment of costs. It lodged a statement of costs totalling HK$2,895,778.06.

Friendship Shipping resisted an indemnity basis award, certificate for two counsel, and summary assessment of costs, describing the costs claimed as “outrageous”.

The parties agreed the legal principles applicable to a consideration of whether to award costs on an indemnity basis.

  1. Costs are at the Court’s discretion pursuant to Order 62 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”).
  2. In exercising its discretion, the usual order for costs made in favour of a successful party in litigation is costs on a party and party basis.
  3. Pursuant to O. 62 r. 28(3) of the RHC, the Court has a broad discretion to order costs on an indemnity basis if it thinks fit to do so.
  4. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Poon Cho-Ming John (No.2) (2020) 23 HKCFAR 74:

“(a) In certain circumstances, costs may be awarded on a more generous than usual basis of taxation to achieve a fairer result.
(b) It is for the receiving party to show that the case has some special or unusual feature.
(c) Such features are not confined to an ulterior motive, an improper purpose, deception or underhand conduct on the part of the paying party.
(d) Neither the attributes of the parties nor the character of the proceedings are irrelevant to the question of whether a more generous than usual basis of taxation should be ordered.
(e) The discretion to order a more generous than usual basis of taxation is not to be fettered or circumscribed beyond the requirement that such taxation be ordered only when it is appropriate to do so.
(f) As to that, the grounds on which a more generous than usual basis of taxation is to be ordered must be connected with the case. That extends to – but no further than to – any matter relating to the litigation and the parties’ conduct in it, and also to the circumstances leading to the litigation.”

  1. RHC O.62 r. 5 sets out “special matters” to be taken into account when the Court is exercising its discretion as to costs. These include the underlying objectives in RHC O. 1A, r. 1, and the conduct of the parties (including the manner in which a party has pursued his case).

The underlying objectives as set out in RHC O.1A r.1 are:

“(a) to increase the cost-effectiveness of any practice and procedure to be followed in relation to proceedings before the Court;
(b) to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable;
(c) to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings;
(d) to ensure fairness between the parties;
(e) to facilitate the settlement of disputes; and
(f) to ensure that the resources of the Court are distributed fairly.”

In the Judge’s view, it was highly unusual to reach a substantive hearing without sworn evidence in support of the application having been filed. The reason it happened in the case in question was because:

  1. Friendship Shipping’s solicitors filed evidence to exhibit the unsworn evidence sought to be relied on by Friendship Shipping;
  2. Friendship Shipping’s solicitors stated that the duly executed evidence would be filed and served as soon as possible.

Generally, solicitors who file evidence in this way on behalf of their clients will use the language of “undertaking” to file the duly executed evidence when available. However, where solicitors stated on the general oath of their affidavit/affirmation that they would do something, the Judge considered there was no material difference in effect. The Judge would describe the statements of intention to file as “undertakings”.

It is standard practice to proceed on the basis of such undertakings where a little more time is required to fulfil technical requirements and/or to overcome logistical difficulties in filing properly executed documents. Legal practitioners and the Court in Hong Kong are familiar with this practice and will proceed on trust that the relevant solicitors will ensure the filing of duly executed documents before any material date. The failure to actually file duly sworn evidence pursuant to an undertaking before a milestone date which was months after the date of the undertaking was in the Judge’s own experience unheard of, and at the very least struck the Judge as very unusual. The OS was issued on 25 June 2024. Friendship Shipping’s solicitors’ first undertakings was dated 2 August 2024. The substantive hearing was on 6 November 2024, over 3 months later.

On the basis of the undertakings, I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester prepared its evidence and its case in response, and took no objection to proceeding towards the substantive hearing. If at any time prior to the hearing on 6 November, the duly executed affirmations on behalf of Friendship Shipping had been filed, there would have been no issue and the OS would have been substantively argued on the basis of such evidence.

Yet, the duly sworn evidence was clearly not filed in advance of the hearing. No warning of this was given by Friendship Shipping to I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester or to the Court. Indeed, at no time did Friendship Shipping or its solicitors provide a full, proper, consistent explanation for this turn of events. Accordingly, I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester prepared fully to argue the case, and the Court allotted resources to hear the case. Had Friendship Shipping been acting responsibly, if faced with logistical difficulties in filing duly executed evidence, it ought to have informed I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester and the Court, and sought directions, presumably for an adjournment of the substantive hearing if it was going to be possible to overcome the logistical difficulties in the future. Yet, Friendship Shipping allowed the OS to proceed to a substantive hearing without admissible supporting evidence which led to a waste of court resources, and unfairness to I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester who had been misled by the undertakings to prepare for a case which was never in fact made.

The Judge found this feature of the case to be special and unusual, and that it alone warranted a more generous than usual basis of taxation. This feature permeated the entirety of the OS from the moment it was issued until the substantive hearing, and accordingly all of I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester’s costs of and incidental to the OS should be taxed on the indemnity basis.

Whilst the Judge found the substantive application for the ASI (assuming Friendship Shipping’s evidence to be admissible) to be unmeritorious, the Judge did not regard it as unusually so, or sufficient to warrant a more generous taxation.

I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester failed to provide a statement of costs with its skeleton argument in advance of the 6 November hearing as provided for in Practice Direction 14.3 para. 8. Para. 15 of the Practice Direction states that such failure is a matter to be taken into account when deciding what costs order to make. The obvious impact was the Judge did not have the benefit of counsel’s submissions at the hearing on the statement of costs. Nor did the Judge have the benefit of being able to compare I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester’s statement of costs with Friendship Shipping’s statement of costs. The Judge still was not provided with Friendship Shipping’s statement of costs and assumed that Friendship Shipping also failed to comply with para. 8 of P.D. 14.3.

It seemed to the Judge that I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester’s costs were very substantial and ought to be considered more carefully than was possible on a summary assessment on paper without the benefit of Friendship Shipping’s own statement of costs and/or an oral hearing.

Friendship Shipping opposed certificate for two counsel for I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester on the basis it had not been justified, and Friendship Shipping was represented by one counsel only.

The Judge considered that the relief sought by the OS was a matter of great significance to I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester and that there was sufficient factual and legal complexity to warrant I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester instructing two counsel.

The Judge accordingly ordered that I.V.L. Dhunseri Polyester’s costs of and incidental to the OS be taxed on an indemnity basis if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel.

Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions or if you would like to have a copy of the Decision As To Costs.



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